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Corporate Control: Markets and Rules
Caroline Bradley*
1. Introduction
It is likely that the impact of statutes on transactions in corporate control in the United
Kingdom will increase in the near future, whether as a result of recent scandals or because
of the introduction of legislation to harmonise rules within the EEC.' For these reasons
it is appropriate to consider again the interests of those who are affected by the operation
of the market for corporate control.
Traditionally, comment on, and regulation of, take-overs has focused on three issues:
(1) the maintenance of proper balances between managerial and ownership interests within
companies which are the targets of take-over attempts, (2) the maintenance of a balance
between the interests of predators and shareholders in the target company, and (3) the
protection of the public interest. The first issue can be traced to the identification by Berle
and Means of a potential conflict between the interests of owners and the interests of
controllers of large corporations. Since Berle and Means, much of the literature about
corporations has concentrated on whether constraints on corporate managerial power are
necessary in order to protect the interests of shareholders. 2 One of the most significant
constraints on corporate managerial power seems to many commentators to be the market
for corporate control, and the threat of displacement which it poses to corporate managements. 3 The idea of the market for corporate control seems to have originated with Berle
and Means, 4 but has since been refined. 5 The second issue arises out of the concern of
regulators that predators should not profit at the expense of target company shareholders, 6 and some of the refinements of the corporate control theory are relevant to this
issue. In practice, the third issue, the protection of the public interest, usually involves
questions of competition policy. 7
These three issues all have different origins, but economic theory is relevant in all cases,
as it suggests that markets operate in the public interest, except where there is market
*Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science.
1 Statutes already affect transactions in corporate control. See, for example: The Fair Trading Act 1973;
sections 146-153 of the Companies Act 1989. On suggestions that the system of regulation of take-overs
will change, see, for example: Gower 'Big Bang and City Regulation' [1988] 51 MLR 1, pp. 19-20;
The Annual Report of the Takeover Panel for the year ended 31st March 1988; EC Proposalfor a Thirteenth
Company Law Directive Concerning Takeovers. A ConsultativeDocument DTI, August 1989, pp.7-12.
2 See, for example: Berle and Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: The
MacMillan Company 1933); Fama and Jensen 'Separation of Ownership and Control' 26 J. L. and Econ
301 (1983); Williamson 'Organisation Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control' 26 J.L. and
Econ, 351 (1983); Victor Brudney 'Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract'
85 Col. L. Rev. 1403 (1985); Helm, 'Mergers, Take-overs, and the Enforcement of Profit Maximization'
in Fairburn and Kay (eds), Mergers & Merger Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989).
3 'The Government believe that the threat of take-over is a powerful spur towards efficiency in the management
of UK Companies.' Mergers Policy. A Departmentof Tradeand IndustryPaperon the policy andprocedures
of merger control. (1988) at para. 2.27.
4 See Berle and Means, note 2 above, p.287.
5 See, for example: Manne 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control' (1965) Journalof Political
Economy 110; Manne 'Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting' 64 Col. L. Rev. 1427 (1964); Marris
The Economic Theory of 'Managerial' Capitalism (London: MacMillan & Co Ltd 1964); Easterbrook
and Fisehel 'Corporate Control Transactions' 91 Yale L. J. 698 (1982); Comment and Jarrell 'Two-Tier
and Negotiated Tender Offers. The Imprisonment of the Free-riding Shareholder' 19 Journalof Financial
Economics 283 (1987).
6 See, for example: The Takeover Panel Guinness PLC. The Distillers Company PLC 14 July 1989.
7 See text at note 103 below.
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failure, such as insufficient competition, or external social costs.' Recent suggestions that
the traditional approach to take-overs does not take adequate account of the interests of
predator company shareholders, employees and suppliers of the target company, the local
community and the public interest 9 are suggestions that take-overs involve external social
costs, which should be eliminated or internalised.
This article describes the market for corporate control theory, and the implications of
this theory for the interests of investors in the target company, and investors in the predator
(if it is a company), and of other affected groups. Current rules which affect the interests
of these various groups are described, and I suggest ways in which the current rules could
be amended in order better to protect the interests of those who may be threatened by
the operation of the market for corporate control. These issues are often ignored in the
context of a regulatory system which has developed in response to perceived abuses in
the market place.l°

2. The Market for Corporate Control
The theory of the market for corporate control is that 'inefficient managers, if not responsible
to, and subject to displacement by, owners directly, can be removed by stockholders'
acceptance of take-over bids induced by poor performance and a consequent reduction
in stock value'." The market for corporate control is supposed to reduce the risk,
identified by Berle and Means, that managers may satisfice or engage in non-profit
maximising behaviour 12 and to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently."
The foundation of the market for corporate control theory is the relationship between
the activities of a company's management and the price of its shares. 4 Inefficient
managers do not take feasible action to maximise the price of the company's shares, 5
and where the management of a company is inefficient in this sense the price of shares
in that company fails to reflect the company's true potential. This creates a 'control
opportunity', an opportunity for a predator to acquire control of the company and appoint
a new management which will act to maximise the share price, and, in so doing, produce

8 See, for example: Stone Regulationand its Alternatives (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press
1982).
9 See, for example: Greene and Junewicz 'A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions'
132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 647-739 (1984) pp.732-5; Coffee 'Shareholders Versus Managers: the Strain in
the Corporate Web' 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1986) p. 12; Takeovers and Mergers. A GMB Plan for Action.
General, Municipal Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union, May 1987; A Market with Rules: Regulating
Takeovers, Mergers and Monopolies Labour Finance and Industry Group, 1988.
10 See, for example: Statement of the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers 'Guinness PLC' 30 January 1987;
Joint Statement of The Stock Exchange and of the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers 30 January 1987.
11 Herman Corporate Control, Corporate Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981) p. 10.
12 See, for example: Manne 'Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting' Note 5 above, p.1432.
13 See, for example: Manne 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control' Note 5 above at p. 119. Manne
suggests that other benefits of the market for corporate control are the lessening of costly bankruptcy
proceedings, more efficient management of corporations and protection to non-controlling corporate
investors, and consequent impact on the liquidity of the market in shares.
The Department of Trade and Industry has endorsed the role of the market in ensuring efficient allocation
of resources. See: MergersPolicy. A Departmentof Trade and Industry Paperon the Policy and Procedures
of Merger Control, note 3 above, and DTI - the Departmentfor Enterprise Cm 278 (1988) para 2.9.
14 See, for example: Manne 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control' note 5 above; Ryngaert 'The
Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth' 20 Journal of FinancialEconomics 377 (1988);
Dann and De Angelo 'Corporate Financial Policy and Corporate Control. A Study of Defensive Adjustments
in Asset and Ownership Structure' 20 Journal of FinancialEconomics 87 (1988).
15 Manne 'Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting' Note 5 above, p. 1431, note 11. If efficiency is defined
as the failure to take action to maximise the price of shares in a company it is not surprising if there
is a correlation between management efficiency and share price.
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capital gains for the predator. The removal of the 'inefficient' management by the predator
reinforces the threat of displacement to the managements of other companies which might
be tempted to engage in inefficient behaviour. 16
There are various explanations for the willingness of predators to pay large premia for
shares in target companies. They may be paying more than the shares are worth, 7 or the
market price of the target's shares may underprice the underlying assets for some
reason,'" or the predator may have identified a more valuable use for the target's assets. 19
If the predator is a company, its management may be seeking to acquire the target in
order to promote its own interests. Despite this, most, if not all, of the arguments a predator
could advance to promote a proposed acquisition if its proposal were challenged may be
seen as varieties of the managerial inefficiency claim. For example, a predator which claims
that an acquisition will create synergy and which is prepared to pay a premium over current
market price for shares in the target is suggesting that the existing target management
could have increased the target's share price by identifying the same synergy.2 0
Anything which makes the process of acquiring control more expensive, including
regulation, interferes with the market for corporate control, 2' because a rational predator
will balance the costs of a take-over against the prospective benefits to be derived from
that take-over. In order for the market for corporate control to work, the predator must
be able to acquire control of the target company for less than the profit it will make by
remedying the existing management's inefficiency to the company. 22 Increasing the costs
involved in implementing take-overs could, therefore, deprive society of the benefits
associated with such transactions.

3. Drawbacks of the Market for Corporate Control
The idea that the market for corporate control functions as a threat to the management
of companies and therefore benefits shareholders, and society, by ensuring that management
acts efficiently and maximises profits is attractive. Although there is a lively debate as
to the extent to which the market for corporate control functions as an effective discipline
to corporate management, most discussion tends to focus on the fine tuning of the regulatory
context in which the market operates. The debate as to the fine tuning has concentrated
on two main areas, that of the defensive tactics a corporate manager may adopt, and
that of equal treatment of shareholders in the target company. Other issues are also
significant, however, such as the position of shareholders in the predator company (if
the predator is a corporate body, rather than an individual), and the effect of take-overs
16 See, for example: Easterbrook and Fischel 'Limited Liability and the Corporation' 52 U. Chi. L. Rev.
89 (1985) p98; Chiplin and Wright The Logic of Mergers (London: Institute of Economic Affairs 1987)
p26; and note 3 above.
17 See, for example: Roll 'The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers' 59 Journalof Business 197 (1986).
18 See, for example: Kraakman 'Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices
as an Acquisition Motive' 88 Col. L. Rev. 891 (1988).
19 See, for example: Chiplin and Wright The Logic of Mergers, note 16 above, pp 23-25.
20 On the synergy theory of take-overs, see, for example: Bradley, Desai and Kim 'Synergistic Gains from
Corporate Acquisitions and their Division between Shareholders of Target and Acquiring Finns' 21 Journal
of FinancialEconomics 3 (1988).
21 See, for example: Fischel 'Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers' 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1978) p. 26; Jarrell and Bradley 'The Economic
Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers' 23 J. L. & Econ. 371 (1980); Ryngaert
'The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth', note 13 above, p. 384.
22 On the calculation of the control premium see, for example: Leebron 'Games Corporations Play: A Theory
of Tender Offers' 61 N. Y.U.L. Rev 153 (1986) p. 163-5; Huang and Walkling 'Target Abnormal Returns
Associated with Acquisition Announcements. Payment, Acquisition Form and Managerial Resistance'
19 Journal of FinancialEconomics 329 (1987).
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on other constituencies, such as employees of the target company, consumers, the local
community and society as a whole. I will consider the impact of the market for corporate
control on three separate groups: target investors, predator investors, and others.
Target Investors
While the market for corporate control may provide an opportunity for some investors
to sell out of a target company subject to an inefficient management at a price which reflects
the potential profit available to the acquirer, the market for corporate control also creates
an incentive for the management of a target company to act in certain ways which are
not likely to benefit investors. A corporate management faced with either a remote, or
an immediate, threat of take-over may respond either by taking action to maximise the
price of shares in the target company, or by acting so as to inhibit a change of control.
For example, in order to increase the price of shares in the company, the management
may decide to change the gearing of the company.23 Alternatively, action which would
drastically increase the consideration a predator would need to pay in order to obtain control
tends to inhibit a change of control. Both types of response may be characterised as defensive
tactics, because both responses may be designed to protect management from the threat
of displacement through take-over.
The question whether the management of a company which is subject to a hostile takeover bid should be prohibited from implementing defensive tactics in the face of that bid
has received much attention. 24 An example of such tactics would be an issue of shares
to a 'White Knight', who, the incumbent management hopes, will not sell them, made
after a potential predator has been identified. The setting up of a new large shareholder
interest of this nature will inhibit the ability of the predator to obtain control of the target.
Commentators advocate the restriction of the ability of management to implement defensive
tactics because they believe that the decision as to whether there is a change in the control
of a company should be made by the shareholders in that company rather than by its
management. 25

Some commentators have considered whether a prohibition on the implementation of
defensive tactics should extend to general defensive tactics as well as specific tactics .26
I use the phrase 'general defensive tactics' to describe action which is designed to make
a company unattractive to any potential predator, and which is taken before any specific
potential predator has been identified.27 An example of such tactics would be a provision
23 See, for example: Kraakman 'Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices
as an Acquisition Motive' 88 Col. L. Rev. 891 (1988) pp. 916-919; Dann and De Angelo 'Corporate
Financial Policy and Corporate Control' 20 Journal of FinancialEconomics 87 (1988).
24 The approaches adopted by commentators vary. See, for example: Lynch and Steinberg 'The Legitimacy
of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers' 64 Cornell L. Rev. 901 (1978); Williamson 'On the Governance
of the Modern Corporation' 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 63 (1979); Bebchuk 'The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers' 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028 (1982); Easterbrook and Jarrell 'Do Targets Gain from Defeating
Tender Offers?' 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 277 (1984); Jarrell 'The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets:
Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?' 28 J. L. and Econ. 151 (1985).
25 See, for example: Easterbrook and Fischel 'The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer' 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981) p. 1198.
26 See, for example: De Angelo and Rice 'Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth' 11
Journal of FinancialEconomics 329 (1983); Linn and McConnell 'An Empirical Investigation of the
Impact of "Antitakeover" Amendments on Common Stock Prices' 11 Journal of FinancialEconomics
361 (1983); Malatesta and Walkling 'Poison Pill Securities, Stockholder Wealth, Profitability and Ownership
Structure' 20 Journalof FinancialEconomics 347 (1988); Jarrell and Poulsen 'Dual Class Recapitalisations
as Antitakeover Mechanisms. The Recent Evidence' 20 Journal ofFinancialEconomics 129 (1988); Ruback
'Coercive Dual-Class Exchange Offers' 20 Journal of FinanicalEconomics 153 (1988).
27 An example of such tactics would be the implementation of a poison pill defence before a take-over is
imminent. See Gilson 'A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers' 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819 (1981) p. 888.
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in the company's constitution giving to the shareholders the right to be bought out at a
substantial premium on a change of control. 28 Such tactics are thought by many
commentators to be less objectionable that specific defensive tactics as they are usually
adopted with the consent of a majority of the shareholders in the company concerned.29
Once a predator appears, a corporate management may act to ensure that an auction
is initiated and control of the company is transferred to the highest bidder ° However,
corporate managements could claim to be initiating an auction to benefit shareholders when,
in fact, they were implementing defensive tactics to protect their own position. Even if
a corporate management were genuinely promoting an auction, its actions could deprive
shareholders of the opportunity to benefit from a share in the premium for the passing
of control, could remove the threat to the management of the company, and could also
lead to a reduction of the number of offers in future.3'
Conclusion
The market for corporate control should benefit investors in companies whose managements
do not actively try to increase the price of shares in the company by offering to such investors
the opportunity of escaping from the company or remaining in the company with a new
management which will try to increase the share price. If a change of control could not
take place, the investors could only escape from the company by selling their shares at
a price depressed by the management's inaction. However, the existence of the market
for corporate control may not adequately protect the interests of target investors if corporate
managements are free to act in ways which, while protecting their own interests, harm
the interests of some or all of the investors in the target.
Predator Investors
There is a limited recognition by commentators that all companies are potential targets.
Predator behaviour is supposed, under the theory of the market for corporate control,
to be the mechanism which disciplines inefficient managements. However, in practice
it may be used by management as a means to ward off market discipline. Some empirical
studies32 suggest that the most effective defence against take-over is the attainment of
great size, and it is possible to view the action of management in promoting a policy of
growth through acquisition rather than pursuing organic growth as self-serving rather than
28 Cf Rule 9 of the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers (the 'Code').
29 Commentators and regulators who consider general defensive tactics to be less objectionable than specific
defensive tactics do so because of the consent of shareholders, rather than because there is no immediate
threat to the management of the company. Specific defensive tactics which are adopted in with the consent
of a majority of the target company's shareholders are generally considered to be harmless. See, for example,
the Code, Rule 21; Malatesta and Walkling 'Poison Pill Securities. Stockholder Wealth, Profitability
and Ownership Structure' 20 Journalof FinanicalEconomics 347 (1988) pp. 348-9; Jensen and Ruback
'The Market for Corporate Control. The Scientific Evidence' 11 Journalof FinancialEconomics 5 (1988)
p. 33; Brickley, Lease and Smith Jr. 'Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments'
20 Journalof FinancialEconomics 87 (1988) pp. 96-97. But see, for example: Ruback 'Coercive DualClass Exchange Offers' 20 Journal of FinancialEconomics 153 (1988) p. 154: 'Shareholders approve
antitakeover provisons because such approval is the least costly alternative presented.'
30 See, for example: Bebchuk 'The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers' 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028
(1985).
31 Easterbrook and Jarrell 'Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?' 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 277 (1984);
c.f. Jarrell 'The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?' 28 J.L. and
Econ. 151 (1985).
32 See, for example: Singh Take-overs: their relevance to the Stock Market and the Theory of the Firm
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1971); Mueller The Determinantsand Effects of Mergers. An
International Comparison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc.
1980); Mueller The Modern Corporation. Profits, Power, Growth and Performance(Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press 1986).
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serving the interests of investors in the company. The attraction of the advantages of
managing a larger enterprise, coupled with the lure of insulation from the danger of
displacement through take-over may suggest that management should not be regarded as
competent to make this type of business decision.33 One way of protecting shareholders
from the activities of managements keen on pursuing aggressive acquisition policies in
order to improve their own position would be the adoption of a rule to disqualify management
from making acquisition decisions without the consent of the shareholders.
There is some debate about whether take-overs do, in practice, benefit acquiring firms.
Empirical studies of the reaction of share prices to announcements of take-over bids show
that shareholders in predator companies do not lose when their companies are involved
in take-overs. 34 However, there is other evidence to35suggest that take-overs do not always
produce the benefits they are alleged to produce.
Not all commentators accept that take-overs involve management in a significant conflict
of interest. Some take the view that the decision to implement an acquisition policy involves
no more of a conflict between the interests of management and investors than any other
business decision.36 The weakness in this argument is that a management which tends to
make bad or self-interested business decisions will not be disciplined by the market for
corporate control if it makes business decisions putting it beyond the reach of the threat
posed by the market for corporate control. The model of the market for corporate control
assumes the existence of market discipline, but its existence may in fact increase the risk
that management will act in its own interests, rather than reducing that risk.
In recent years evidence has been collected to suggest that large conglomerates are subject
to a threat of break-up or demerger acquisitions. 37 Corporate managements seem to
pursue acquisitions in order to protect their companies from the threat of take-over, but
at some point the nature of the conglomerate, produced by these acquisitions, seems to
render it vulnerable to the threat of take-over, so that it may be broken up. Where a
conglomerate is subject to the threat of a demerger take-over, this suggests that acquisitions
which produced the conglomerate in the first place failed to increase efficiency. The
phenomenon of break-up take-overs seems to be desirable in the interests of increased
efficiency: these transactions are an example of the market for corporate control reasserting
itself. Take-overs do, however, involve transaction costs, and this process involves an
increased number of take-overs, so it would be preferable if take-overs which fail to increase
efficiency did not occur in the first place.
Social Costs of Take-overs
Private gains from take-overs may be made at the expense of groups not directly involved
33 See, for example: Roll 'The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Take-overs' note 17 above; Dent Jr.
'Unprofitable Mergers: Towards a Market-Based Legal Response' 80 N.W.U.L. Rev. 777 (1986) p. 782.
34 See, for example: Asquith, Bruner and Mullins Jr. 'The Gains to Bidding Firms from Merger' 11 Journal
of FinancialEconomics 121 (1983); Jensen and Ruback 'The Market for Corporate Control. The Scientific
Evidence' 11 Journal of FinancialEconomics 5 (1983) pp. 16-22; Chiplin and Wright The Logic of
Mergers note 16 above, pp. 68-70.
35 See, for example: Roll 'The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers' note 17 above; Chiplin and
Wright The Logic of Mergers note 16 above, pp. 65-68; Mergers Policy. A Departmentof Trade and
Industry Paper on the policy and procedures of merger control (1988) at para 2.10: 'The bulk of the
evidence ... is that the commercial performance of enterprises post-merger has, more often than not,
failed to live up to the claims of the acquiring firm at the time of the merger.'
36 Fischel 'Efficient Capital Market Theory, The Market for Corporate Control and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers' 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1978) p. 43, note 147.
37 See, for example: 'Takeover Activity in the 1980s' Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin February 1989
78, 79; Coyne and Wright (eds), Divestment and Strategic Change (Oxford: Philip Allan Publishers Limited
1986); Wright, Chiplin and Coyne, 'The Market for Corporate Control: the Divestment Option' in Fairburn
and Kay (eds), Mergers & Mergers Policy note 2 above.
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in the transactions." The costs involved may be of two types: transition costs necessarily
involved in the change from an inefficient use of resources to a more efficient use of
resources, and other costs.
The activities of those involved in the market for corporate control may harm the interests
of groups such as consumers, creditors and investors in the stock market. The public interest
may also be affected, for example in relation to research which is not undertaken in the
private sector as a result of the existence of the market for corporate control. Whether
financial markets are excessively affected by short term considerations or not, 39 corporate
managers may believe in short termism and decide not to invest in long term research
projects because of the risk that such investment would have a negative impact on share
price. A corporate predator which pays more for control of target companies than that
control is worth increases the risk that it will either become insolvent and go into liquidation
or that it will become a target for a 'break-up' take-over! 0 If the company becomes
insolvent the interests of creditors may be adversely affected. A break-up take-over may
remove some of the costs involved in a liquidation, but will involve other costs.
Although take-overs seem to involve some social costs, various factors do operate to
limit the effect of these costs. The company is at a 'confluence of multiple markets',"4
and the operation of these markets will tend to constrain the activities of the managements
of the predator and target. For example, in the absence of a monopoly situation, competition
in the product market will operate to ensure the maintenance of the quality of the product,
and that the price of the product does not increase excessively. Competition rules apply
to protect the product markets, although such rules tend not to 4be
applied to conglomerate
2
mergers as stringently as to horizontal and vertical mergers.
In practice, some acquisitions result in an increase in the level of debt of the combined
enterprise. 43 An increase in the level of debt of an enterprise may increase the risk to
existing creditors of that enterprise. Mervyn King recognises this cost to third party creditors,
but suggests such costs as exist are costs related to gearing, rather than costs related to
highly leveraged take-overs."4
If the acquisition significantly increases the power of the combined entity in the markets
in which it operates, the predator might engage in monopolistic practices. For example,
it might manufacture goods of worse quality, increase the price it charges for goods or

38 On social costs, see, for example: Coase 'The Problem of Social Cost' 3 JL & Econ. 1 (1960); Calabresi
'Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules - A Comment' 11 JL & Econ. 67 (1968);
Buchanan and Faith 'Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities' 24 JL & Econ. 95 (1981);
Ullmann, 'The Structure of Social Costs' in Ullmann (ed), Social Costs and Modem Society (Westport,
Connecticut: Quorum Books 1983).
39 See, for example: Chiplin and Wright The Logic of Mergers note 16 above, pp. 53-55.
40 See, for example: Monopolies and Mergers Commission Lonrho Limited and House of FraserLimited.
HC 73 (1981) The Commission considered, at para. 7.52, that there was 'at least a very real and substantial
risk that the efficiency of House of Fraser would deteriorate seriously as a result of the merger, and
that it would be detrimental to the public interest that it should be exposed by the merger to such a risk'.
41 Coffee Jr. 'Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web' 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1986)
p. 100.
42 See, for example: Monopolies and Mergers Commission Lonrho Limited and Scottish and Universal
Investments Limited and House of FraserLimited. HC 261 (1979) at para. 8.18: because Lonrho and
Scottish and Universal Investments were conglomerates no issues of restriction or distortion of competition
arose. For comments on the issues raised by conglomerate mergers see Monopolies and Mergers
Commission Blue Circle IndustriesLimited and Armitage Shanks Group Limited Cmnd 8039 (1980) at
paras. 8.29 to 8.34.
43 See for example King, 'Takeover Activity in the United Kingdom' in Fairburn and Kay (eds), Mergers
& MergerPolicy note 2 above, pp. 108-110; Taggart Jr, 'The Growth of the "Junk" Bond Market and
its Role in Financing Takeovers' in Auerbach (ed), Mergers and Acquisitions (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988).
44 King, 'Take-over Activity in the United Kingdom' in Fairburn and Kay (eds), Mergers & Merger Policy
note 2 above, p. 110,
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services, and increase the length of time it takes to pay its bills. In the short term such
actions could be harmful to consumers and suppliers. Other actions the predator might
take after the acquisition could include the centralisation of the combined entity's operations
in one site, or the reduction of investment in research and development.
The interests of groups other than investors in the target company and the predator
company are likely to be affected by the predator's action. Is it, therefore, appropriate
for the decision whether the acquisition should go ahead to be made by the shareholders
in the target company who will be offered part of the predator's anticipated profit in return
for their shares?
In addition to the effects of the predator's actions on groups other than the investors
in the target and in the predator itself, we should consider the effects of action by a
management which is trying to insulate itself from the threat of take-over on such groups.
Herman has suggested that: 'managerial capitalism may yield social inefficiencies by its
better integration into an efficient capital market that heavily discounts large but uncertain
long term profits (and disregards the positive social externalities of the longer view and
risk-taking) '.41
A management which feels subject to the threat of displacement through take-over is
likely to be reluctant to invest in research and development or in any activity which is
unlikely to generate profits in the near future, even if the activity in question were a sensible
long term strategy. If the market for corporate control does tend to discourage corporate
managements from investing in projects which might result in large profit in the future
in favour of projects which will result in small certain profits in the short-term, the market
may not be as effective in ensuring the efficient allocation of resources as is often suggested.
The market for corporate control encourages management to take all feasible action
to maximise the price of shares in the company, and could encourage management to
maximise the share price through the release of information to the market or by some
other means. Managements may often tread the fine line between permissible action to
46
maximise the price of shares in their companies and unlawful market manipulation.
Shareholders in the company would tend to benefit from manipulation geared to maximising
the company's share price, but investors in the market at large would tend to suffer as
a result of such action, because market prices would not tend to reflect the true value
of the shares.

4.

The Regulatory Framework in the United Kingdom

Market mechanisms, company law and the quasi-legal provisions 47 which regulate takeovers all provide some protection of the interests of investors before and during a takeover, and, to some limited extent, protection of the interests of employees and creditors
and others who may be affected by take-overs. Regulators and commentators on these

45 Herman Corporate Control, CorporatePower Note 10 above, p. 100.
46 Section 47 of the Financial Services Act 1986 prohibits market manipulation. However, the boundaries
of the offence are uncertain. Could off-balance sheet financing amount to unlawful market manipulation?
On off-balance sheet finance see Weesman 'Off-balance Sheet Finance: The Quest for an Accounting
Solution' The Investment Analyst 89 July 1988, 4.
47 I use the word 'quasi-legal' to refer to the rules promulgated by the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers
because, although the Panel has no statutory authority to make law, and the Introduction to the Code
emphasises that it does not constitute law as such, the Code has had an impact on the development of
the common law. See, for example: Gething v Kilner [1972] 1 WLR 337; R v Panel on Take-overs and
Mergers ex.p. Datafin plc [19871 2 WLR 699; R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers ex.p. Guinness
[19891 1 All E R 509; and McCrudden 'Codes in a Cold Climate: Administrative Rule-making by the
Commission for Racial Equality' (1988) 51 MLR 409.
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various mechanisms and regulations emphasise investor protection. 48 However, the
market for corporate control is, it is argued, itself a mechanism for protecting investors.
In theory, the market should ensure the efficient allocation of resources: owners of capital
would furnish that capital for the most efficient possible use, because the most efficient
use would provide the best return for the owners of capital. In practice, no markets are
unregulated. For example, the current regime applicable to take-overs in the United Kingdom
involves regulation of defensive tactics 49 combined with a complete lack of regulation of
the 'financial or commercial advantages or disadvantages' of a change of control.5 0
Financial and commercial issues are not regulated because such issues are thought to be
a matter for the company and its shareholders, unless specific questions relating to the
public interest, usually involving competition policy, are raised. The refusal to regulate
financial and commercial issues indicates an acceptance of the market as an appropriate
decision-making process. This reinforces the market for corporate control. On the other
hand the regulation of defensive tactics indicates a recognition that the market for corporate
control may act against the interests of shareholders.

Company Law
In a large company many of the directors will not be actively involved in management
but will, in theory, perform the function of monitoring management."s In practice,
directors of companies which are taken over as a result of hostile take-overs are likely
to lose their directorships.12 Although there may be a distinction between the seriousness
of a threat of take-over to executive directors and to non-executive directors, in practice
all directors are subject to the threat provided by the market for corporate control in the
same way as other members of a company's management.
In legal theory, the fundamental duty imposed on a director is to act bona fide in what
the director considers to be the best interests of the company and not for any collateral
purpose. 3 In addition a director must avoid all conflicts of interest.5 4 The law imposes
duties on directors, rather than on management, largely because when the duties were
developed there was no separation between direction and management. 5 Directors are
subject to fiduciary duties,5 6 duties of care and skill, and statutory duties. In 4ddition,
48 For example: Paragraph 1(a) of the Introduction to the Code emphasises that it 'represents the collective
opinion of those professionally involved in the field of take-overs as to good business standards and as
to how fairness to shareholders can be achieved.' The maintenance of such standards is thought to be
important to the integrity of the financial markets in the United Kingdom.
49 See the Code, General Principle 7, Rule 21.
50 See the Introduction to the Code at section 1(a).
51 See, for example: Fana and Jensen 'Agency Problems and Residual Claims' 26 J.L. & Econ. 327 (1983)
p. 331; Axworthy 'Corporate Directors - Who Needs Them?' (1988) 51 MLR 273; Jensen and Ruback
'The Market for Corporate Control. The Scientific Evidence' 11 Journalof FinancialEconomics 5 (1983)
p. 43.
52 For judicial recognition of this threat see Hogg v Cramphorn [1967] 1 Ch 254, 265. See also David
Lodge, Nice Work (Secker and Warburg 1988) at p. 263: '"What you mean," said Vic bitterly, "is that
by selling off Pringle's now, you can show a profit on this year's accounts at the next AGM." Stuart
Baxter examined his nails, and said nothing. "I won't work under Norman Cole," said Vic. "Nobody's
asking you to, Vic," said Baxter'.
53 Re Smith and Fawcett [1942] Ch 304.
54 Bray v Ford[1896] AC 44. For consideration of the conflicts of interest involved in management buyouts,
see, for example: Booth 'Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty'
60 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 630 (1985); Schleifer and Vishny, 'Management Buyouts as a Response to Market
Pressure' in Auerbach (ed), Mergersand Acquisitions note 43 above. The Take-over Panel introduced
new rules to deal with management buyouts in January 1990.
55 See, for example: In re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Company (1878) 10 Ch. D. 450, 452: directors
were 'commercial men managing a trading concern for the benefit of themselves and of all the other
shareholders in it'.
56 Directors' fiduciary duties are often characterised as representing the terms of the contracts investors
would make with the directors if they were to negotiate such contracts. See, for example: Easterbrook
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duties are imposed on directors by service contracts. For managers who are not directors,
service contracts are the only basis for their duties to the company,
The basic duty of a director to act bona fide in the best interests of the company is
formulated subjectively: the courts do not review directors' decisions in order to discover
whether it was reasonable to consider that a particular course of action was in the interests
of the company or not.57 However, in exceptional circumstances, the directors' objectives
may be taken into account
in deciding whether they are exercising their powers for the
58
proper purposes or not.
The directors' objectives have been held to be a relevant consideration in relation to
issues of shares the purpose of which was to prevent a change of control. 9 This doctrine,
the 'proper purposes doctrine', which has so far been limited to the question of issues
of shares to friendly third parties to inhibit a change of control could be extended to other
defensive tactics. 6 For example, suppose a board of directors sought to ward off a
potential predator by entering into onerous contracts with third parties, arguing that, in
their opinion, the contracts were in the best interests of the company. If the directors were
acting in good faith it would seem to be necessary to use the proper purposes doctrine
in order to challenge their actions. 61 It is not clear, however, that such an action would
be likely to succeed in relation to a company involved in a public market. 62 Shareholders
in a target company would want to take action against the delinquent directors to prevent
the use of defensive tactics, or to obtain a remedy if the directors' action were successful
in preventing the take-over. However, in practice, shareholders are not likely to find out
about proposed defensive tactics in time to prevent their use, and, in general, litigation
about breaches of directors' duties is corporate litigation and thus usually controlled by
the directors.
Even if the directors of the target company have breached their fiduciary duties in opposing
a potential take-over, it is not clear that a minority shareholder will be entitled to bring
an action in respect of a breach of duty owed to the company, as the company itself should
sue in respect of a breach of a duty owed to the company unless one of the exceptions
to the rule in Foss v Harbottle applies.63 A minority shareholder in a target company
should be able to benefit from one of the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle to
prevent the directors of the company from engaging in illegal acts, for example, manipulating
the market price of shares in the company. 64 The purchase or sale of large amounts of
and Fischel 'Corporate Control Transactions' 91 Yale L. J. 698 (1982) pp. 701-2.
57 Cf the operation of the 'business judgement rule' in the United States. See, for example: Greene and
Junewicz, note 9 above p. 712; Stegemoeller 'The Misapplication of the Business Judgement Rule in
Contests for Corporate Control' 76 N.W.U.L. Rev. 980 (1982); Easterbrook and Fischel 'The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer', note 25 above, pp. 1194-1198.
58 Hogg v Cramphorn 11967] Ch 254; Bamford v Bamford [1970] Ch 212; Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum
[1974] AC 821; Clemens v Clemens [1976] 2 All ER 268. The precise limits of the doctrine are unclear.
59 Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum [1974] AC 821, 837. Although the company in this case appears to
have been involved in a public market (see pp. 827, 828, 838) the other cases in which the proper purposes
doctrine has been applied in the United Kingdom have involved unquoted companies.
60 See, for example: Gelfond and Sebastian 'Re-evaluating Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender
Offer' 60 B.U.L. Rev. 403 (1980) at p. 415; Lofthouse 'Competition Policies as Take-over Defences'
(1984) JBL 320, 333.
61 For a suggestion that shareholders have a personal right to prevent directors from acting for an improper
purpose, see Re A Company (005136 of 1986) [1987] BCLC 82.
62 Courts in the United Kingdom are reluctant to interfere in the take-over process. See, for example: R
v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers exp Guinness [1989] 2 WLR 863, 868; Re Ricardo Groupplc [1989]
BCLC 566, 577.
63 (1843) 2 Hare 461.
64 This exception does not seem to extend to obtaining a remedy once an illegal act has occurred. See Smith
v Croft [19871 3 WLR 405. But see also section 11 A of the Companies Act 1985, introduced by section
131 of the Companies Act 1989 removing barriers to remedies in damages for shareholders. If a shareholder
were to have a personal right not to have the value of her shareholding affected by unlawful acts of the
directors, this provision might allow a remedy in damages.
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shares on the market may have significant effects on the price of such shares, and such
action may amount to criminal offences such as market manipulation, purchase by a company6
of its own shares, 5 or financial assistance for the purchase of a company's own shares.
The main difficulty an investor would encounter in relation to such activity would be in
discovering its existence; for example it appears that the Guinness bid for Distillers in
1987 involved a price support operation which was not discovered until well after the
event, and then only by accident. Similar difficulties would arise if the directors of the
company were, on the other hand, engaged in an attempt to manipulate the market by
means of a selective release of information.
In addition to the difficulties of discovering what the directors were doing, a minority
shareholder might find it difficult to pursue litigation during a take-over bid, partly because
of the reluctance of the courts to interfere with the take-over process, and partly because
it seems that the courts are reluctant to accept that litigation is an appropriate mechanism
markets6 7
for resolving disputes within companies which are subject to public
are
Another problem created by the rule in Foss v Harbottle is that directors' duties
68
owed to the company, and not, as a general rule, to shareholders in the company. The
fraud on the minority exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottleis unlikely to apply where
directors implement defensive tactics in order to preserve their position, unless the directors
are involved in activities such as market manipulation. Even if a minority shareholder
were held to be entitled to bring an action, other than a personal action, against directors
for breach of their duties, and were to succeed in that action, any remedy would benefit
the shareholder only indirectly. The remedy would go to the company, and, although an
increase in the company's assets might be reflected in the market price of the company's
shares, whether such an increase would compensate the minority shareholder for the loss
actions would depend on the market's
she had sustained as a result of the directors'
69
perception of the adequacy of the remedy.
The courts have recognised that in certain circumstances directors may owe duties directly
by directors to
to shareholders. For example, during a take-over offer, the duties owed
70
shareholders include a duty to be honest, and a duty not to mislead. It is conceivable
that a minority shareholder could bring an action against directors who defeated a takeover attempt by means of misleading target company shareholders into believing that the
offer would not provide sufficient consideration for their shares. The minority shareholder
would, however, only be able to prove damage if she could show that the offer would
have succeeded had it not been for the directors' misleading statements, that, apart from
the statements the offer would have been accepted by holders of shares carrying at least
50% of the voting rights in the company. In practice such an action would seem to be
unlikely to succeed.
The position of shareholders in a predator company is no better. The subjective
formulation of the director's duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the company
suggests that directors who contemplate the acquisition of another company might rely
on a claim that they believed the acquisition was in the best interests of the company.
However, the threat of displacement by take-over, which is reduced by the decision to
become a predator, suggests that directors should not be considered competent to make
65 Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409, section 23 of the Companies Act 1985.
66 See section 151 of the Companies Act 1985.
67 See e.g. PrudentialAssurance v Newman Industries [1982] Ch 204 at p. 225: 'the Prudential, not being
the proper plaintiffs, had no knowledge of what had gone on inside Newman'.
68 Percival v Wright [19021 2 Ch 421; although see Re A Company note 61 above.
69 A minority shareholder in a quoted company is not entitled to recover damages for a decrease in the
value of the investment: PrudentialAssurance v Newman Industries (No 2) [19821 Ch 204, 222, because
'such a "loss" is merely a reflection of the loss suffered by the company. The shareholder does not suffer
any personal loss.'
70 Gething v Kilner [1972] 1 All ER 1166, 1170.
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such decisions because of the potential conflict between their own personal interests and
the interests of the shareholders. The impact of the proper purposes doctrine may extend
to take-overs designed not to benefit the company but to entrench management in its position.
If the directors were to argue that in their view the entrenchment of their position would
be beneficial to the company, a shareholder who wished to challenge their actions would
have to use arguments based on the proper purposes doctrine,
Minority shareholders in predator companies who wish to bring an action will be faced
by significant procedural barriers, which are aggravated in relation to large companies.
A minority shareholder in a large company will have substantial evidential and other
problems in mounting litigation. After the decision of the Court of Appeal in Prudential
Assurance v Newman Industries" the 'fraud on the minority' exception to the rule in
Foss v Harbottle will not afford much assistance to a minority shareholder in a company
involved in a take-over. An investor in a company which makes a take-over offer for another
company because the directors believe that the take-over will increase their power, prestige
and remuneration (although in fact it will actually harm the acquiring company) is unlikely
to be able to show that such action amounts to a fraud on the minority by those in control.
Such action would not fall in the same category as cases involving an actual misappropriation
of corporate property . 72 Unless there is an express provision requiring shareholder
consent to proposed take-overs creating a personal right for shareholders, or the directors
engage in some type of illegal activity in order to promote the take-over, a minority
shareholder is therefore unlikely to be able to challenge such action.
Present rules fail to recognise that a minority shareholder in a predator does have an
interest in whether a take-over attempt is pursued or not because a successful take-over
will result in a transfer of wealth from the predator shareholders to the target
shareholders.73
As things stand, a minority shareholder in a predator company is even less likely to
be able to challenge actions of the directors in relation to takeovers than a minority
shareholder in a target company. One way of reducing the impact of the rule in Foss v
Harbottle in this area would be to grant to shareholders personal rights to decide on particular
types of action. 74 Amendment of the Articles of Association of a company to require
shareholder approval by a special majority before particular actions such as making a takeover bid or implementing defensive tactics would allow minority shareholders to litigate
if the requirement were not complied with, 7 at the cost of constraining the operation of
the market for corporate control. Such a rule could enhance the ability of minority
shareholders, if not to monitor management activity, at least to ensure that management
took adequate account of the interests of minority shareholders during a take-over bid.
On the other hand, such a solution would only be effective if the courts would recognise
such a personal right, if shareholders were able and willing to litigate, and if management
believed that litigation would be likely if they did not comply with the requirement.
The City Code on Take-overs and Mergers
Because, in practice, the impact of company law on take-overs is limited, the City Panel
on Take-overs and Mergers developed the Code to regulate the conduct of take-overs.
The aim of this body of quasi-legal rules is: 'to ensure fair and equal treatment of all
71 [1982] Ch 204.
72 See, for example: Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554.
73 Nor is there any recognition of this potential threat to predator shareholders in the Code, which assumes
that take-overs threaten target shareholders, rather than predator shareholders.
74 An example of the application of the personal rights exception to the Rule is Edwards v Halliwell [1950]
2 All ER 1064.
75 Edwards v Halliwell, see note 74 above, is also an example of the special procedure/special majority
exception to the rule.
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shareholders in relation to take-overs'. 7 6 The General Principles contained in the Code
emphasise this aim, 77 and the Code contains detailed requirements as to the procedures
which must be followed during a take-over transaction, 7 and as to the information which
must be provided to shareholders. 79 The requirements contained in the Code relating to
the disclosure of information are subject to the criticisms which apply to any disclosure
requirements, namely that it is not evident that the costs of imposing the requirements
outweigh the benefits produced by the requirements and that the information required
to be disclosed is not necessarily of use to shareholders&i Empirical measurement of the
costs and benefits associated with such requirements is, of course, problematic.
One of the most important elements in the Code is the requirement that in certain
circumstances a 'mandatory offer' be made.81 The aim of this requirement is to ensure
that all shareholders in the offeree company may share in the premium for control, by
requiring a general offer to be made to shareholders in the target company on a change
of control. The level of consideration offered to target shareholders must equal the highest
price paid for shares of the same class in the target company in the twelve months preceding
the bid.
It is possible that a requirement of this nature increases the cost to predators of acquiring
the control of target companies. Although the aim of the rule is to ensure that the premium
for control is not paid to one or more shareholders who actually transfer control, but is
shared among all of the shareholders in the target company, 2 it is arguable that the
expense incurred by predators in preparing formal offer documents exceeds the benefits
provided to minority shareholders by the mandatory offer, and that the high cost of acquiring
control may discourage many transactions which might benefit target company shareholders.
Even if there were no rule requiring a predator to make a mandatory offer, minority
shareholders in target companies would still seem to be in no worse position after a change
of control than they were under the previous 'inefficient' management. Indeed, if the predator
is to avoid future take-overs by other predators it will have to increase the company's
share price, which presumably benefits minority shareholders.
So long as the target company remains part of a public market, therefore, minority
shareholders in the target company are subject to no greater risk than they were before
the change of control. By contrast, if the change of control involves a 'going private'
transaction, minority shareholders whose position was adversely affected by a successful
predator's actions can bring an action against the predator claiming that the predator's
conduct was unfairly prejudicial to their interests. 3 The existence of this remedy should
deter predators from acting in ways which prejudice the interests of minority shareholders.
The minority shareholders in the target company will suffer loss as a result of the change
of control only if the predator is able to use its position to benefit itself at the expense
of the minority shareholders. The predator could, for example, strip the assets of the target
company and transfer the proceeds to itself, leaving the minority shareholders with an

76
77
78
79
80

See the Introduction to the Code at Section l(a).
See e.g. General Principles 1, 4, 5.
See e.g. Rules 1, 2, 9-11, 30-32.
See e.g. General Principles, 4, 5, and Rules 19, 23-29.
See, for example: Kripke 'A Search for a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy' 31 Business Lawyer
293 (1975).
81 See Rule 9.
82 On equal treatment in sales of control see, for example: Leech 'Transactions in Corporate Control' 104
U. Pa. L. Rev. 725 (1956); Jennings 'Trading in Corporate Control' 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1956); Brudney
and Chirelstein 'Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers' 88 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1974); Cohn
'Tender Offers and the Sale of Control: An Analogue to Determine the Validity of Target Management
Defensive Measures' 66 Iowa L. Rev. 475 (1981); Bebchuk 'Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal
Treatment in Corporate Takeovers' 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (1985).
83 See section 459 of the Companies Act 1985.
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interest in a mere shell.' 4 Rules which protect the right of shareholders to receive
dividends,85 which protect the holders of class rights from variation of their rights
without their consent,8 6 and which require new issues of shares to be made pro rata to
existing shareholdings 7 reduce this risk. Such rules, if enforced, reduce the risk posed
to minority shareholders in a target company.
The Code also deals with the question of directors' conflicts of interest. General Principle
9 provides that 'Directors of an offeror and the offeree company must always, in advising
their shareholders, act only in their capacity as directors and not have regard to their personal
or family shareholdings or to their personal relationships with the companies. It is the
shareholders' interests taken as a whole, together with those of employees and creditors,
which should be considered when the directors are giving advice to shareholders.' In addition
to this general provision, the Code prohibits the directors of the offeree company from
taking action 'which could effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated or
in the shareholders being denied an opportunity to decide on its merits'." The Code also
contains specific examples of action which falls within the prohibition s9 but in the light
of the Code's emphasis on the spirit rather than the letter of its provisionsIO the
prohibition would seem to cover any possible defensive tactic which a board of directors
might think of adopting in the face of a bid. The provisions of the Code do not, however,
restrict the ability of companies to adopt general, as opposed to specific, defensive tactics
because they apply only after the board 'has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might
be imminent'. 9l A general policy of pursuing growth through acquisition to avoid
becoming a target would not be affected by the rule. This rule is expressed sufficiently
restrictively to prevent directors of target companies from acting to encourage auctions
because such action 'could effectively result in' a 'bona fide offer being frustrated'.92
This rule should protect shareholders in target companies from action by directors of
target companies aimed to prevent a take-over from succeeding. In this way the rule
reinforces the market for corporate control.
Shareholders in target companies have little legal protection against defensive mechanisms
designed to defeat the operation of the market for corporate control. Although there is
a continuing debate about whether the Code is an effective regulatory system, 93 the Code
fills this gap by providing significant, if not excessive, benefits to such shareholders. Predator
shareholders are not protected by the Code. On the other hand, the transaction costs imposed
on predators by the Code may discourage transactions which might benefit target
shareholders.
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission has recently suggested that 'the Department
of Trade and Industry and the appropriate City regulatory authorities might consider whether
any change is desirable in the rules in order to require the consent at a General Meeting
of the shareholders of the bidding company before a bid may be completed. ' 94 The
Commission thought that the interests of shareholders in the bidding company were affected
by highly leveraged bids.
84 Regulators have developed rles to prevent asset stripping in order to maintain public confidence in the
markets. However, to an economist, asset stripping is not necessarily an undesirable practice as it involves
the transfer of resources to a more efficient use. See, for example: Mergers Policy. A Department of
Trade and Industry Paper on the policy and procedures of merger control. (1988) at para 2.25.
85 See, for example: Re A Company (No. 00370 of 1987) ex p Glossop [1988] 1 WLR 1068.
86 See sections 125-129 Companies Act 1985.
87 See sections 89-96 Companies Act 1985.
88 General Principle 7.
89 See Rule 21.
90 See the Introduction to the General Principles.
91 See General Principle 7.
92 See General Principle 7.
93 See, for example: Hurst 'Self Regulation versus Legal Regulation' (1984) 5 Co. Law. 161.
94 Elders IXL Ltd and Allied-Lyons plc Cmnd 9892 (1986) at para 8.54.

The Modern Law Review

[Vol. 53

The Response of Regulation to Social Costs
Although much of company law is geared to the protection of the interests of investors
in companies other themes are discernible. For example, incorporation has been viewed
as a privilege, or concession, one which gave rise to correlated obligations on the part
of those involved in corporate enterprise. 9 In recent years commentators have
emphasised the idea of the social responsibility of the corporation, and debate has focused
on the question of the extent to which directors of a company should consider the interests
of groups such as employees, consumers and the local community in the area in which
the company carries on its operations. 96 Corporate managements promote schemes to
protect the environment or to increase employment opportunities, although such activities
may result from a feeling that they will promote good public relations as often as from
a feeling of responsibility to society. Indeed, it is possible for company law 97to impose
limits on the right of corporate managements to work for the general good.
In practice, directors of companies are rarely required to consider the interests of persons
other than shareholders. Directors have a statutory duty to consider the interests of
employees, 9 and judges have recently recognised a duty to consider the interests of
creditors where the company is insolvent, 99 or even doubtfully solvent.'00 These duties
are of limited value to those whom they are meant to benefit: the duty to consider the
interests of employees is enforceable in the same way as are the other duties imposed
on directors, and is therefore subject to the rule in Foss v Harbottle. The duty to creditors
will in any event be enforced as part of a liquidation.
The Code also suggests that directors should consider the interests of employees and
creditors of the company in advising shareholders,10 however, the provisions of the Code
are generally geared to the protection of investors. The Code aims to ensure that the decision
as to whether a take-over will succeed or not is taken by the target shareholders, a group
which will have no further interest in the company's affairs if it decides to accept the
offer - unless the consideration offered consists of shares in the offeror. This could be
an argument in favour of a requirement that all offerors offer a consideration in shares
rather than cash, to tie target company shareholders to the interests of the continuing entity
to ensure that their decisions reflected the interests of that entity rather than their own
personal interests. However, this suggestion conflicts with views that shareholders should
be allowed to sell out so they are not forced to continue in an enterprise different from
that in which they invested. 102 Moreover, a requirement that target shareholders remain
involved in the combined entity could reduce the allocative efficiency of the market for
corporate control.
Take-overs and mergers are subject to scrutiny by the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission under the provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1973, and the Commission is
able to block transactions which will operate 'against the public interest. ' 13 The Director
95 See, for example: Stokes, 'Company Law and Legal Theory' in Twining (ed), Legal Theory and Common
Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986), p. 162.
96 See, for example: Hopt and Teubner (eds), Corporate Governance and Directors' Liabilities (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter 1985).
97 See, for example: Rosemary Simmons v UDT [1986] 1 WLR 1440.
98 See section 309 of the Companies Act 1985.
99 West Mercia Soafetywear v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250.
100 Brady v Brady (1987) 3 BCC 535, 552 (obiter) (CA), reversed [19881 2 WLR 1308.
101 See General Principle 9.
102 See, for example: Bradley and Rosenzweig 'Defensive Stock Repurchases and the Appraisal Remedy'
96 Yale L. J. 322 (1986) p. 331.
103 Sections 69(1)(b), 69(4) and 84 of the Fair Trading Act 1973; and see Craig, 'The Monopolies and Mergers
Commission: Competition and Administrative Rationality' in Baldwin and McCrudden (eds), Regulation
and PublicLaw (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1987); Fairburn, 'The Evolution of Merger Policy
in Britain' in Fairburn and Kay (eds), Mergers and Mergers Policy note 2 above.
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General of Fair Trading has said that 'in assessing the public interest, my primary concern
(though not an exclusive concern) has been whether competition would be adversely
affected. '104
It seems that when considering whether to recommend to the Secretary of State that
a proposed merger be referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission for consideration
the Director General of Fair Trading assesses the public interest on the basis of whether
competition could be affected adversely. When the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
considers proposed mergers many other considerations are included in the question of
whether the merger will operate contrary to the public interest.
During 1986, of the fourteen reports of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission which
were published and presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,
six dealt with mergers. 05 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission decided that two out
of the six proposed mergers might be expected to operate against the public interest.'°6
In one of these cases the merger was allowed to proceed, subject to undertakings,0 7 in
the other case the merger was not allowed to proceed. 108
The reports on these proposed mergers reveal that the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission took various factors into account. For example, in the BET report, the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission refers to effects on efficiency, 1o9on research and
development and product development,11 0 on employment,"' on safety and training," 2
and on imports. '"In the Elders report, in addition to competition considerations, " 4 the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission took account of the potential effect on employment" l5 and of the question of whether Elders might raid the surplus in the AlliedLyons pension fund." 6 Other considerations involved the likelihood of the reverse
situation being allowed in Australia. 117 In the report, the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission considered the general question of highly leveraged bids,"" and recommended that the Bank of England and the Stock Exchange should consider whether new
controls were desirable to deal with such bids. "'
In another case, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission considered a predator's financial position, and the effects that this might have on the target or the region in which the
target operated. 'A company's activities might be subject to such risks that it would be
contrary to the public interest for it to expand its business by acquisition because by doing
so it would either increase the degree of that risk or widen the area of activity affected by the
104 Annual Report of the DirectorGeneral of Fair Tradingfor the period Januaryto December 1985 to the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry HC 403 (1986). See also DTI - the departmentfor Enterprise
CM 278 (1988) at pars 2.10, indicating that in the future decisions as to whether to refer mergers, and
the assessment of mergers by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, will continue to be based mainly
on the likely effect of the merger on competition, although other issues may occasionally be considered.
105 British Telecommunications PLC and Mitel CorporationCmnd 9715 (1986) ('BT'); BET Public Limited
Company and SGB Group plc Cmnd 9795 (1986) ('BET'); The General Electric Company plc and The
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risk."2 0 In another report the Commission decided that a merger would be contrary to
the public interest because the predator's past record showed that it appeared 'to have
bought and sold subsidiaries with regard mainly to the immediate financial interests of
the group."'2 In yet another report 12the
Commission considered the implications of foreign
2
ownership of a British company.
It is apparent that, despite the rhetoric of merger control, which emphasises competition,
regulators are prepared to consider other factors, and to prevent take-overs on the basis
of other factors. The DTI has recently identified factors which will be taken into account
in determining the effect of a merger on competition, although it has said that: Jilt is
not possible to set out rules of thumb which can be staightforwardly or mechanically applied
to all cases'. 213 In the same report, the DTI expressed the Government's view that the
effects of mergers on employment, on the regions, and on research and development
spending, and the effects of highly leveraged bids and foreign take-overs are matters where
24
there is usually no divergence between the interests of private sector decision makers.
It remains to be seen whether the Monopolies and Mergers Commission will ignore these
matters in future.

5. Conclusion
Current regulation of take-overs in the United Kingdom concentrates on protection of
shareholders in target companies, and on restriction of the adverse effects of take-overs
on competition. Both systems of regulation are costly, involving the institutional costs
of running the system and the transaction costs imposed on participants in take-overs.
For this reason, it is important that regulation achieves its aims.
Three criticisms of the current system may be made: (1) greater legal protection should
be provided to target company shareholders; (2) the interests of predator company
shareholders should be recognised and protected; and (3) protection of the public interest
should operate in a less haphazard and more predictable manner. In general, regulation
of the way in which take-overs are effected, and regulation of public interest issues involved
in take-overs should be co-ordinated in a single scheme, rather than by two regulatory
bodies. It is not clear that issues involving the interests of target and predator company
shareholders are sufficiently distinct from issues involving other interests to justify separate
systems.
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